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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A final Order in this claim was entered by the Labor Commission on March 24, 
2005. (R. 663-667). A Petition for Review was filed on April 25, 2005. (R. 668). 
Accordingly, this Court has Jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2a-3(2)(a) and 34A-2-801(8). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue 1: Whether the Utah Labor Commission was correct in upholding the 
determination of ALJ Hann that the decedent's claimed permanent and total disability did 
not arise out of an accident in the scope of his employment on June 5, 1985. 
Issue 2: Whether there was a binding determination of the issue of legal 
causation of the decedent's claimed permanent and total disability prior to the 
determination in ALJ Harm's Order dated April 18, 2002. 
Issue 3: Whether, in any event, Petitioner's claim to permanent and total 
disability benefits abated at the time of decedent's death on August 19, 1997. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 is a question of fact. "Whether or not the injury arises out of or within the 
scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each case." State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). "In reviewing 
questions of fact, we defer to a great degree to the Commission's findings and reserve 
only where they are without foundation in the evidence." Id. at 1052. Issue 1 was raised 
at the hearing held on October 27, 2003, and in ERF's Memorandum in Response to 
Motion for Review. (R. 00671 at p. 12; R. 00636-652). 
Issue 2 involves a mixed question of fact and law. "In determining whether the 
commission correctly applied the findings of basic facts to the legal rules governing the 
case, we will uphold the Commission, so long as its decision was reasonable in light of 
the language of the statute, the purpose it aims to achieve and the public policy behind it." 
Id. (citing Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)). Issue 2 was raised at the hearing held on October 27,2003, 
and in ERF's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Review. (R. 00671 at pp. 20-22; 
R. 00636-652). 
Issue 3 is a question of law. "In reviewing the Commission's interpretation of 
general questions of law, we apply a correction-of-error standard, with no deference given 
to the expertise of the Commission." Id. Issue 3 was raised at the hearing held on 
October 27, 2003, and in ERF's Memorandum in Response to Motion for Review. (R. 
00671 at p. 14; R. 00636-652). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1984). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1984). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-423 (2003). 
2 
S I \ FEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is founded in an Application for Hearing filed by the Petitioner1 on May 
1, 1997, seeking permanent and total disability benefits for an injury he received on June 
5, 1985. (R. 00001). Because the Application sought prunanent ami lulal JiMtlnlity 
benefits for a 19XS injury, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") was named as a 
defendant to the Application.2 
Petitioner first suffered a compensable industrial injur/ on h\W ?1 1978, when he 
was struck in the head by the boom of a concrete pumping i. * • < -* >* * - • • \t thai 
time, Petitioner was employ eel by his ow n f inn, Strate Western Concrete Pumping. 
(R. 00671 at p. 6). Petitioner received a permanent partial impairment award for the 1978 
injury and returned to work reportedly, without significant limitation. (R. 00595). 
Petitioner also sued the manufacturer of the concrete pumping iruck in relation to his 
1978 injury and received a settlement av\ard thai eontinues to pay an annuity of 
For purposes of this brief, the term "Petitioner" may refer variously to the 
original applicant, Walther W. Strate, or to Stephen E. Strate, the Administrator of the 
Estate of Walther W. Strate, which claims to have succeeded to the application. 
2
 ERF is a fund of the State of Utah, maintained pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-702 and 703 (referred to as the Second Injury Fund in some of the statutes 
referenced herein). In general, the ERF is responsible for the payment of benefits in 
certain cases 
3 
approximately $1,000.00 per month to his estate.3 (R. 00671 at pp. 55-57). Sometime 
thereafter, Petitioner lost his own business to his ex-wife and in 1985 went to work for his 
brother at Steve Strate Crane Services. (R. 00590). Petitioner's former business (owned 
by his ex-wife) and Steve Strate Crane Services shared warehouse space in 1985. 
(R. 00671 at p. 49). 
The 1985 injury alleged by Petitioner to be the cause of his total disability was an 
intentional assault by Henry Rudkin, the boyfriend of Petitioner's ex-wife. Mr. Rudkin 
was apparently laying in wait and struck Petitioner in the head with a length of pipe when 
he went to a storeroom to obtain supplies.4 (R. 00011). At the time of the attack, 
Petitioner was working for Steve Strate Crane Services. Contrary to the allegation in the 
Brief of Petitioner (Brief of Petitioner p.2), Mr. Rudkin did not work at Steven Strate 
Crane Services and was not a co-worker of the Petitioner. (R. 00671 at p. 39). Other 
than the coincidence of location, the record discloses no connection between Petitioner's 
scope of work and the assault by Mr. Rudkin. 
Following the assault, Petitioner sued Mr. Rudkin and received a settlement of 
$75,000.00 . 5 (R. 00591). Petitioner also filed a claim for temporary total and permanent 
3
 Petitioner is survived only by his non-dependent brother Stephen E. Strate, and 
one sister. It is in their interest that this claim is proceeding. 
4
 Petitioner's physicians described the nature of the attack. See R. 00670, 1-051, 
1-067; R. 00592. 
5
 While Petitioner now argues that the 1985 assault was a compensable industrial 
accident, Petitioner did not treat it as such when he settled the claim against Mr. Rudkin. 
4 
partial workers compensation benefits. (K. 110012). The Statu Insurance Fund (now 
Workers c ompensation Fund) iniliall) prov ided w orkers compensation coverage to 
Steve Strate Crane Services and began paying Petitioner workers' compensation benefits 
to Petitioner based upon his representation that his 1985 injury was the result of an 
industrial accident. (R. 00006). The State Insurance Fund later discovered that 
Petitioner's 19<S S injury was actually the result ofati assault that may have arisen out of a 
persona! dispute and denied Petitioner further benefits. (R. 00007). 
Petitioner then filed an Application for Hearing alleging that his 1 c< s ininry 
resulted in character and personality changes which in Imu may have contributed to the 
circumstances leading to the 19<S5 attack (R 0000 7) In November 1986, Petitioner and 
the State Insurance Fund entered into a "Settlement of A Claim of Disputed Validity" 
("1986 Settlement"). (R.00006-09). Under the terms of the 1986 Settlement, the State 
Insurance Fund compromised the claim and agreed to pay benefits to the Petitioner f'oi all 
injuries and disabilities arising out of the June 5, 19K> litftit \ "us if'that injury arose out of 
the July 21, 1978 industrial accident." (R. 00007) (emphasis added). Because 
Petitioner's 1986 Application did not seek permanent and total disability benefits, ERF 
(or it predecessor Second Injury Fund) was not a party lo the elaim. 
He did not for example, give written notice of the proceeding or remit any portion of the 
$75,000.00 recovery to ERF in respect of its subrogation rights as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 34A-2-106. Even assuming, arguendo, Petitioner's 1985 assault was a 
compensable industrial accident, ERF continues to claim subrogation rights to the third-
party settlement (R. 00671 at p. 117). 
5 
On May 1, 1997, 12 years after the assault, Petitioner filed for the first time an 
Application for Hearing claiming permanent and total disability benefits for the injury he 
received on June 5, 1985. (R. 00001). Shortly thereafter, on August 19, 1997, Petitioner 
died of hepatic failure and chronic liver cirrhosis. (R. 00593).6 Counsel for Petitioner 
approached the Worker's Compensation Fund ("WCF") (successor to the State Insurance 
Fund) and ERF in November and December of 1997 to propose a resolution to 
Petitioner's claim. (R. 00425-429). The proposed stipulation spoke in the present tense 
about entitlement to ongoing benefits and future medical treatment, as if Petitioner were 
still alive. In particular, the 1997 Stipulation states that the Petitioner "is 47 years old" 
and "is currently totally disabled, and in all likelihood will never be able to work again." 
(R. 00064-00069). The Stipulation even goes so far as to specify that after the Petitioner 
is placed on the ERF payroll, future compensation shall be subject to increases 
"beginning 01/01/98 for as long as the Applicant shall live." (R. 000066-67). The fact 
that Petitioner had died and that his prior counsel had not been authorized to represent the 
estate were concealed from ERF during the negotiation process. (R. 00425-429). 
Unaware of those relevant facts, and in order to compromise the case, ERF signed 
a Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("1997 Stipulation"). (R. 
6
 His workers' compensation claim was not listed as an estate asset and his 
workers' compensation attorney was not authorized by the probate court to take any 
action . The estate was closed on September 13, 1998, without mention of the claim. 
(R. 00670, 2-023 and 025). 
6 
00425-429). Only after receiving the signature of the WCF and ERF, counsel for 
Petitioner signed the 1997 Stipulation on the signature line labeled "WALTER W. 
STRATE Applicant" as "Walther W. Strate by Stephen E. Strate, Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Walther W. Strate by Virginius Dabney" and submitted the 1997 
Stipulation for approval without furnishing a copy of the fully executed document or 
cover letter to ERF. (R. 00425-429). In other words, ERF was not informed that 
Petitioner has passed away months before the Stipulation was prepared, signed, or filed. 
The 1997 Stipulation was then approved by ALJ Donald L. George for ALJ Kathleen 
Switzer on December 30, 1997. 
Upon learning the Petitioner had died on August 19, 1997, and that it had been 
induced into signing the 1997 Stipulation on false pretenses, ERF filed a motion to set 
aside the 1997 Stipulation. (R. 00073-117). After several procedural delays, including an 
unauthorized appeal of an order disqualifying Petitioner's counsel (R. 00502-504), ERF's 
motion to set aside was set for hearing on April 1, 2002. Prior to the beginning of the 
evidentiary hearing where Petitioner's counsel had been subpoenaed to give testimony 
regarding the pretenses under which the 1997 Stipulation had been obtained, Petitioner 
agreed with ERF's motion and the 1997 Stipulation was formally set aside. (R. 00589). 
ALJ Harm then agreed with the position advanced by ERF and ordered that 
Petitioner's Application for Hearing be dismissed because the claim for permanent and 
total disability benefits had not accrued prior to Petitioner's death. (R. 00445-450). 
7 
Petitioner appealed the dismissal and the dismissal was affirmed. (R. 00502-505). The 
matter was then reconsidered in light of recent statutory changes and remanded for further 
proceedings. (R. 00571-573).7 Petitioner's claim for permanent and total disability 
benefits was again heard by ALJ Hann on October 27, 2003. During the hearing, the 
parties stipulated that Petitioner was injured by the 1985 assault and would have been 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of those injuries. (R. 00589). While the 
stipulation addressed the medical cause of Petitioner's disability, it did not address the 
legal cause of those injuries, and the parties did not stipulate that the 1985 attack arose 
out of or in the course of Petitioner's employment. (R. 00589). 
Argument was made and testimony was taken regarding the circumstances of the 
attack and preparation of the 1997 Stipulation during the October 27, 2003 hearing. 
(R. 00671 at pp. 40-54, 59-67). Following hearing on the issues, ALJ Hann concluded 
the injuries were caused by an intentional assault unrelated to the scope of Petitioner's 
employment and that Petitioner "failed to prove by a preponderance of substantial 
evidence that the petitioner was injured in the course and scope of his employment on 
June 5, 1985." (R. 00595). Petitioner's claim was therefore denied. On July 20, 2004, 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Review which was opposed by ERF. (R. 00608-00662). On 
March 24,2005, the Labor Commission issued its Order Denying Motion for Review 
7
 ERF does not agree with this holding by the Labor Commission because the 
statutory change in question, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-423, does not apply retroactively. 
See Argument III below. 
8 
agreeing that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that the 1985 
assault arose out of or in the course of his employment. (R. 00663-00667). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner first suffered a compensable industrial injury on July 21, 1978, 
when the boom of a concrete pumping truck broke loose striking him in the head. 
(R. 00011). 
2. At the time of the 1978 injury, Petitioner was employed by his own firm, 
Strate Western Concrete Pumping. (R. 00671 at p. 6). 
3. Petitioner brought suit against the pump manufacture and received a 
settlement of annuity payments, now approximately $1,000.00 per month. The annuity 
payments continued after Petitioner's death and are received by his estate. (R. 00671 at 
pp. 55-57). 
4. Petitioner received a permanent partial impairment award for the 1978 
injury and returned to work reportedly, without significant limitation. (R. 00595). 
5. In approximately 1985, after losing his own business to his ex-wife, 
Petitioner went to work for his brother at Steve Strate Crane Services. (R. 00590). 
9 
6. On June 5, 1985, while working at work at Steve Strate Crane Services, 
Petitioner went to the storeroom to obtain supplies and was attacked by Henry Rudkin, 
the boyfriend of Petitioner's ex-wife. (R. 00011). 
7. Mr. Rudkin struck Petitioner in the head with a length of pipe and Petitioner 
suffered a severe head injury. (R. 00589). 
8. Petitioner sue Mr. Rudkin and received a settlement in the amount of 
$75,000.00. (R. 00591). 
9. Petitioner also filed a claim for temporary total and permanent partial 
workers' compensation benefits for the injury his sustained in the 1985 attack. 
(R. 00590). 
10. The State Insurance Fund, workers' compensation carrier for Steve Strate 
Crane Services, began paying benefits to Petitioner in reliance upon his representation 
that his 1985 injury was the result of an industrial accident. (R. 00006). 
11. In the course of investigating Petitioner's claim, the State Insurance Fund 
learned that the altercation which resulted in Petitioner's injury may have arisen out of a 
personal dispute with Mr. Rudkin rather than out of Petitioner's employment. As such 
the State Insurance Fund denied payment of further benefits. (R. 00007). 
12. Petitioner then filed an Application for Hearing alleging that his 1978 injury 
resulted in character and personality changes which may have contributed to the 
circumstances leading up to the 1985 attack. (R. 00007). 
10 
13. In November 1986, the Petitioner and the State Insurance Fund entered into 
a Settlement of a Claim of Disputed Validity. (R. 00006-09). 
14. Under the terms of the 1986 Settlement, the State Insurance Fund 
compromised the claim by agreeing to pay stated benefits to the Petitioner for his 1985 
injury "as i/that injury arose out of the July 1978 industrial accident." (R.00007) 
(emphasis added). 
15. The parties to the 1986 Settlement did not stipulate that Petitioner's 1985 
injury arose in the course or scope of his employment or that the attack was a 
compensable industrial claim. (R. 00006-09). 
16. ERF (then the Second Injury Fund) was not a party to the Petitioner's claim 
for permanent partial disability benefits for the 1985 injury and was neither a party nor a 
signatory to the 1986 Settlement. (R. 00006-09). 
17. On May 1, 1997, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing claiming for 
the first time permanent and total benefits for the injury he suffered on June 5, 1985. (R. 
00001). 
18. On August 19, 1997, Petitioner died of hepatic failure and chronic liver 
cirrhosis. (R. 00593). 
19. In November and December 1997, despite, and without notice of, 
Petitioner's death, ERF and the Worker's Compensation Fund ("WCF") (as the successor 
11 
to the State Insurance Fund) were approached by Petitioner's counsel offering a 
resolution of the pending claim. (R. 00425-429). 
20. In the course of negotiations, Petitioner's counsel wrote of ongoing 
treatments and entitlement to benefits as if Petitioner were still alive. In particular, he 
failed to disclose to ERF or WCF that the Petitioner had died on August 19, 1997, and 
that counsel had not been authorized to represent the estate. (R. 00425-429). 
21. During the time Petitioner's counsel negotiated the resolution of 
Petitioner's claim with ERF and WCF, he was not been retained by the Petitioner's estate 
and did not have authority to settle the claim. (R. 00671 at pp. 61-62). In particular, 
Counsel for Petitioner did not contact Stephen Strate, the representative of Petitioner's 
estate, until December 19, 1997, after the Stipulation had been negotiated and signed by 
WCF and ERF. (R. 00671 at pp. 61, 66-67) 
22. Being unaware of these relevant facts, and in order to compromise the 
complex case, ERF signed the 1997 Stipulation on December 18, 1997. (R. 00425-429). 
23. The signature line labeled WALTHER STRATE, Applicant was blank 
when ERF signed the 1997 Stipulation. (R. 00425-429) 
24. On December 19, 1997, after obtaining the signatures of the WCF and ERF 
under these false pretenses, counsel for Petitioner signed the 1997 Stipulation "Walther 
W. Strate by Stephen E. Strate, Personal Representative of the Estate of Walther W. 
Strate by Virginius Dabney." He did not alert ERF that he had signed the Stipulation 
12 
purporting to act for the estate and then submitted the Stipulation for approval of the ALJ. 
(R. 00425-429). 
25. Counsel for Petitioner did not provide ERF with a copy of the fully 
executed Stipulation and, though Mr. Boorman of the ERF was listed on the cover letter 
sent to ALJ Switzer with the Stipulation, neither the letter nor the executed Stipulation 
was received by ERF. (R. 00061; R. 00425-429). 
26. Upon learning that the Petitioner had died before the 1997 Stipulation was 
even proposed, ERF filed a motion to set aside the 1997 Stipulation arguing that ERF's 
signature was obtained by fraud and that Petitioner's counsel did not have authority to 
bind Petitioner's estate. (R. 00073-117). 
27. ERF also filed a Motion to Disqualify Counsel as he was a necessary 
witness to the negotiations. An order granting the Motion to Disqualify Counsel was 
issued on February 15, 2001. Petitioner filed a Motion for Review of the disqualification 
order which was denied by the Labor Commission on June 28, 2001. The Petitioner then 
filed a Petition for Review with this Court, Case # 20010610-CA, which was dismissed 
on October 18, 2001, because the Labor Commission's June 28, 2001 order denying the 
Motion for Review was not a final agency action. (R. 00589). 
28. ERF's motion to set aside the Stipulation was set for hearing on April 1, 
2002. (R. 00589). 
13 
29. At the beginning of an evidentiary hearing where counsel for Petitioner had 
been subpoenaed to give testimony regarding the pretenses under which the 1997 
Stipulation had been obtained, Petitioner stipulated to ERF's motion and the 1997 
Stipulation was set aside. (R. 00589). 
30. Stephen Strate and J. Grant Moody appeared at the April 1, 2002 hearing 
representing the estate of Walther W. Strate. ERF objected to their representation of the 
estate because the estate had been closed on September 13, 1998, and Stephen Strate's 
appointment as personal representative had been terminated. (R. 00589). 
31. The estate of Walther Strate was ultimately re-opened and Stephen Strate 
re-appointed as personal representative in May, 2002. (R. 00671 at p. 64). 
32. On April 18, 2002, ALJ Hann ordered that Petitioner's application for 
hearing must be dismissed because the claim for permanent total disability benefits had 
lapsed on Petitioner's death. (R. 00445-450). 
33. Petitioner appealed the order of dismissal and it was affirmed by the Labor 
Commission. (R. 00502-505). 
34. After reconsideration, in light of the adoption of Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
423 (2003), the matter was remanded for further proceedings. (R. 00571-573). 
35. Petitioner's claim for permanent and total disability benefits was then heard 
by ALJ Hann on October 27, 2003. (R. 00671). 
14 
36. During the course of the October 27, 2003 hearing, the parties stipulated 
that Petitioner had been injured during the 1985 attack and that he would have been 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of those injuries. The stipulation addressed 
the medical cause of Petitioner's disability but the parties did not stipulate that the 1985 
assault arose out of or in the course of Petitioner's employment. (R. 00589). 
37. During the October 27, 2003 hearing, argument was made and testimony 
was taken regarding the circumstances surrounding the 1985 assault and the preparation 
of the 1997 Stipulation. (R. 00671 at pp. 40-54, 59-67). 
38. ALJ Hann ultimately concluded that Petitioner "failed to prove by a 
preponderance of substantial evidence that the petitioner was injured in the course and 
scope of his employment on June 5, 1985." (R. 00595). 
39. Petitioner filed a Motion for Review with the Labor Commission seeking a 
reversal of ALJ Hann's May 5, 2004 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
(R. 00608-00632). 
40. ERF Opposed Petitioner's Motion for Review. (R. 00636-00652). 
41. On March 24, 2005, the Labor Commission issued its Order Denying 
Motion for Review upholding ALJ Hann's determination. The Labor Commission 
reviewed the evidence provided by Petitioner and concluding that Petitioner failed to 
meet its burden to show that the 1985 assault arose out of or in the course of his 
employment. (R. 00663-00667). 
15 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The June 5, 1985 attack against Petitioner by his ex-wife's boyfriend, while 
occurring at Petitioner's place of employment, was an intentional attack by a third-party, 
personal in nature. The attack did not arise out of or in the course of Petitioner's 
employment with Steve Strate Crane Services. Therefore, the attack is not a compensable 
industrial accident and Petitioner is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his 
injuries. Petitioner himself ultimately treated the injury as non-industrial by suing the 
third-party and retaining the proceeds of threat action outside of the workers' 
compensation context. 
The issue of whether Petitioner's 1985 assault arose out of or in the scope of his 
employment was properly before ALJ Hann during the October 27, 2004 hearing because 
the matter had not been previously adjudicated. Petitioner incorrectly argues that the 
1986 Settlement adjudicated the issue of legal causation for his 1985 injury. (Brief of 
Petitioner p. 16). However, ERF was not a party to, and is not bound by, the 1986 
Settlement. Furthermore, by its own terms, the 1986 Settlement Agreement was not an 
adjudication. Rather, by compromise, liability for the Petitioner's 1985 claim was 
assigned back to the 1978 industrial accident, and therefore to Petitioner's 1978 
Employer, Strate Western Concrete Pumping. The parties to the 1986 Settlement did not 
stipulate that the 1985 assault arose out of or in the course of Petitioner's employment. 
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Neither did the 1997 Stipulation adjudicate the issue of whether Petitioner's 1985 
assault arose out of or in the course of his employment. In plain terms, the 1997 
Stipulation was obtained by fraud and was therefore meaningless. Moreover, the 1997 
Stipulation was set subsequently aside by agreement of the parties. As the 1997 
Stipulation was withdrawn, its terms can have no binding effect whatsoever. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's 1985 injuries were the result of a 
compensable industrial accident, Petitioner's claim for permanent and total disability 
benefits abated upon his death on August 19, 1997. At the time of Petitioner's injury, 
Utah law was clear to the effect that claims for workers' compensation benefits abate at 
the time of the employee's death if not previously reduced to an award. While that result 
was altered by the Legislature in 2003, the enactment contained no language indicating a 
legislative intent that it was to be applied retroactively. As Petitioner died before his 
claim for permanent and total disability benefits was reduced to an award, his claim 
abated upon his death. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S 1985 INJURY DID NOT RESULT FROM AN 
ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT 
Petitioner's 1997 claim for permanent and total disability benefits is based upon 
the injury he received from the 1985 assault. (R. 00001). While Petitioner previously 
sustained a compensable industrial injury on July 21, 1978, the Application for Hearing 
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clearly alleges that the injury supporting his claim for permanent and total disability 
benefits arose from the June 5, 1985 attack. (R. 00001). This is consistent with the fact 
that Petitioner only claimed a permanent partial disability following his 1978 industrial 
injury and returned to work without significant limitation. (R. 00589, 00592, 00593). 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1984) provides that a worker is entitled to benefits for 
injuries resulting from an "accident arising out of or in the course of his employment." 
By contrast, injuries that are the result of a conflict with a third person concerning matters 
unconnected to the applicant's employment are not compensable even if they occur at the 
work place. Wilkerson v. Industrial Commission, 266 P. 270 (Utah 1928). Petitioner's 
1985 injuries clearly resulted from the attack by his ex-wife's boyfriend. During the 
October 27, 2003 hearing, the parties stipulated that "[o]n June 5, 1985 the petitioner was 
assaulted by Henry Rudkin, the petitioner's ex-wife's boyfriend, who was not employed 
by Strate Crane Service." (R. 00589). Petitioner's reports to his treating physicians about 
the 1985 attack also disclosed the personal nature of his conflict with his assailant. 
(R. 00592). Representations of counsel and the testimony of Stephen E. Strate at the 
October 27, 2003 hearing also confirmed the personal nature of Petitioner's conflict with 
Mr. Rudkin. (R. 00671 at pp. 48-55).8 Conversely, Petition has provided no evidence 
showing that the attack by Mr. Rudkin was in any way related to Petitioner's employment 
8
 As noted, Petitioner himself treated the accident as non-industrial when he sued 
and collected from his assailant without acknowledgment of ERF's notice and 
subrogation rights under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 or its 1985 predecessor § 35-1-62. 
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at Steve Strate Crane Service. Thus, the Labor Commission was correct in determining 
that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing that the attack arose out of or in the 
course of his employment. 
In an attempt to make up for the lack of evidence, Petitioner vociferously argues 
that the liberal construction doctrine requires that all doubts regarding the industrial 
nature of his injury must be resolved in his favor, no matter how remote or 
inconsequential. (Brief of Petitioner p. 24-26). His argument does not avail. It is true 
that the courts and the Industrial Commission have a duty to "construe the Workers' 
Compensation Act liberally in favor of employee coverage when statutory terms 
reasonably admit of such a construction." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 
679 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). While the beneficial policies of the Workers' 
Compensation Act are freely acknowledged by ERF, Petitioner's argument that an award 
of benefits is required even where there is a lack of proof greatly distorts the policy of the 
law. Petitioner's arguments, if adopted, would result in an affirmative presumption of 
entitlement to benefits in all cases. Such a burden shifting presumption is not, and has 
never been, a part of Utah's Workers' Compensation law. 
Moreover, "[t]he time honored rule of law is that the construction of statutes by 
governmental agencies charged with their administrations should be given considerable 
weight, however, if it is made clearly to appear that the statute has been misconstrued or 
misapplied it is the duty of the court to correct the same." McPhie v. Industrial 
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Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). As noted the controlling statute is Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1984) which provides that workers are entitled to benefits for 
injuries resulting from "accidents arising out of or in the course of his employment." 
Benefits for injuries from an assault by a non-coworker are not within the scope, and in 
fact are well outside of the scope, of the statute. Utah courts have consistently required 
proof of a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986). As the Allen Court noted, the standard of 
proof for causation is that of a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Petitioner argues the 
liberal construction required of the Workers' Compensation Act as a substitute for his 
burden of proof. However, the relevant statutory terms do not admit this "liberal" 
construction. Furthermore, Petitioner has not made, nor would the record support, a claim 
that the Labor Commission misconstrued or misapplied the governing statute. 
Petitioner also makes a great deal of the fact that a tape of a June 23, 1987 hearing 
held in relation to Petitioner's 1985 claim for permanent partial disability claims was 
destroyed by the Adjudication Division of the Labor Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-420(2) provides that "[r]ecords pertaining to cases that have been closed and 
inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a 
claim has been filed as in Section 34A-2-417, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission." Petitioner's claim for permanent partial disability benefits for his 1985 
injury was resolved by the 1986 Settlement Agreement and the subsequent rulings of ALJ 
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Allen on March 9 and March 21, 1988. Petitioner did not bring a claim for permanent 
total disability benefits until 1997, and did not request the transcript of the 1987 
permanent partial disability hearing until June 2, 2004 - 17 years after the hearing date 
and 6 years beyond the statutory retention date. The standards for document retention are 
clear, as the fact that the unavailability of the tape was due only to Petitioner's long delay 
in filing his permanent total disability claim. 
Petitioner unfairly implies some impropriety by suggesting that the "head of the 
Adjudication Division which ordered the tape destroyed is also the Administrator of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund." (Brief of Petitioner p. 24). This allegation is not 
supported by the record, and is absolutely and recklessly false. While ERF does fall 
under the auspices of the Labor Commission, it is wholly distinct from the Adjudication 
Division. In fact, the Adjudication Division is a distinct division within the Labor 
Commission and chief judge, Richard LaJeunesse, acts as director of that division. The 
administrator of ERF is not part of and does not control the Adjudication Division. She 
cannot, and does not, order the Adjudication Division to take any specific action -
including the destruction of tapes or transcripts. There is simply no basis for Petitioner to 
suggest that ERF, as a party to this action, ordered the destruction of the tape. 
Because the affirmative evidence clearly shows that the dispute between Petitioner 
and his assailant was personal in nature and that the only connection the assault had to 
Petitioner's employment was a coincidence of location, the Labor Commission was 
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correct in upholding ALJ Harm's ruling that the Petitioner failed to show that he was 
injured in the course and scope of his employment on June 5, 1985. 
II. THE ISSUE OF LEGAL CAUSATION FOR PETITIONER'S 1985 
INJURY WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED 
In the course of the October 27, 2003 hearing, the parties stipulated that the 1985 
assault was the medical cause of Petitioner's permanent and total disability. (R. 00589). 
However, at no point prior to ALJ Hann's May 5, 2004 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order was the legal causation of Petitioner's disability adjudicated. 
a. ERF Was Not a Party to the 1986 Settlement Agreement and the 
Agreement is Not Binding Against ERF 
ERF was not a party, nor was it signatory, to the 1986 Settlement Agreement and 
therefore cannot be bound by the Agreement. The 1986 Settlement Agreement was 
entered into by Petitioner and the State Insurance Fund in resolution of Petitioner's claim 
for permanent partial workers' compensation benefits for his 1985 injury. (R. 00003-
00009). Petitioner did not make a claim for permanent total disability benefits that would 
involve ERF until May 1, 1997. (R. 00001). At that time, by statute, ERF (or the Second 
Injury Fund) was only liable for payment of benefits in certain cases resulting in a 
permanent and total disability. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1984). As Petitioner's 1985 
claim dealt only with a permanent partial disability, ERF did not face any potential 
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liability for the claim and therefore was not a party to, or even in privity with any party to, 
the 1986 Settlement.9 
Moreover, even if ERF had been a party to the 1986 Settlement, the agreement did 
not stipulate that Petitioner's 1985 assault arose out of his employment. Because the 
compromise reached by the parties to the 1986 Settlement involved treatment of the 
impacts of the 1985 assault as if from the 1978 accident, they did not need to reach the 
issue of legal causation. The parties simply did not address the issue of whether the 1985 
assault arose out of Petitioner's personal conflict with Mr. Rudkin rather than out of 
matters related to his employment with Steve Strate Crane Services. (R. 00006-09). 
Since the parties agreed, for purposes of settlement, to treat and compensate the 
Petitioner's permanent partial disability claim as if were an extension of his 1978 injury, 
the stipulation does not address, and can not bind ERF, on issues related to Petitioner's 
later permanent total disability claim. 
Petitioner makes issue of the fact that ERF did not file a Motion for Review 
regarding the 1986 Settlement. Yet, he acknowledges ERF was not a party to the 1986 
Settlement. ERF had neither standing nor reason to challenge it. Petitioner correctly 
notes that, under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(2), the decision of an administrative law 
9
 Privity, in terms of claim preclusion, is only applied to those with a sufficiently 
close identity of interests. See, Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558, 562 (Utah 2000). As ERF 
did not face even potential liability for the 1985 claim it was not in privity with any of the 
parties to the 1986 Settlement Agreement. 
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judge is a final order of the commission 30 days after the decision is issued unless 
appealed by a party in interest. However, that argument is irrelevant to the issues before 
the Court since ERF was not a party in interest to the 1986 Settlement Agreement, was 
not obligated to make any payments to Petitioner under the Agreement, and was not a 
party to ALJ Allen's 1988 Order. 
b. The 1997 Stipulation Was Obtained by Fraud, Was Set Aside by 
the Parties, and Has No Binding Effect 
Petitioner also claims that the 1997 Stipulation somehow stands as evidence of 
legal causation. (Brief of Petitioner p. 26). Petitioner makes this argument in spite of the 
fact that the 1997 Stipulation was obtained by fraud and was ultimately set aside by 
stipulation of the parties, including Petitioner. As such, the 1997 Stipulation can have no 
evidentiary or binding effect on the parties or upon the court. Generally, "parties are 
bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the court." Yeargin, Inc. v. State 
Tax Commission, 20 P.3d 287, 292 (Utah 2001) (quoting First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assoc., 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979)). However, when a 
stipulation is withdrawn by the parties and such withdrawal is recognized by the court, the 
stipulation is negated and the consequence is that there is no evidence in the record. See, 
General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 105 P.2d 340, 341 (Utah 1940). The 
especially follows considering the 1997 Stipulation was obtained by fraud and without 
authority from the personal representative of the estate. 
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As noted, Petitioner first filed an Application for Hearing claiming permanent total 
disability benefits for the injuries he sustained during the June 1985 assault on May 1, 
1997. (R. 00001). This was the first time ERF was named or joined as a Defendant as to 
any of Petitioner's claims. Petitioner died on August 19, 1997, of hepatic failure and 
chronic liver cirrhosis. (R. 00593). In November and December 1997, WCF and ERF 
were approached by Petitioner's counsel regarding a resolution of the pending claim. (R. 
00425-429). However, in negotiation Petitioner's counsel concealed from ERF and WCF 
the fact that Petitioner had died some three months previously, and in correspondence 
clearly implied that Petitioner was alive. (R. 00425-00429). The 1997 Stipulation drafted 
and presented by Petitioner's counsel misleadingly speaks in the present tense regarding 
ongoing impacts and future treatment for the Petitioner. (R. 00064-00069). Specifically, 
the 1997 Stipulation states that the Petitioner "is 47 years old" and "is currently totally 
disabled, and in all likelihood will never be able to work again." (R. 00064-00069). The 
Stipulation even goes so far as to specify that after the Petitioner is placed on the ERF 
payroll, future compensation shall be subject to increases "beginning 01/01/98 for as long 
as the Applicant shall live." (R. 000066-67). 
Petitioner's counsel also failed to inform ERF and WCF that he was not authorized 
to represent the estate. (R. 00425-00429). Petitioner's counsel negotiated the 1997 
Stipulation beginning in October and November 1997, but he did not even discuss the 
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1997 Stipulation with the personal representative of Petitioner's estate until December 19, 
1997. (R. 000671 at pp. 61, 66). 
Unaware of these relevant facts, ERF signed the 1997 Stipulation on December 18, 
1997, and returned it to Petitioner's counsel to obtain Petitioner's signature. (R. 00427). 
Significantly, the 1997 Stipulation had already been signed by Petitioner's counsel when 
it was presented to ERF and it had a blank signature line labeled "WALTHER W. 
STRATE, Applicant." (R. 00427 and 00068). On December 19, 1997, after having 
fraudulently obtained the signatures of counsel for WCF and ERF, Petitioner's counsel 
signed the 1997 Stipulation "Walther W. Strate by Stephen E. Strate, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Walther W. Strate by Virginius Dabney." (R. 00427 and 
00068). Counsel for Petitioner then submitted the executed document for approval to 
ALJ Switzer. (R. 00427). 
While counsel for Petitioner included a cover letter to ALJ Switzer referencing 
Petitioner's death, he did not deliver the fully executed document and the cover letter to 
ERF. (R. 00427-428). ERF was unaware of Petitioner's death when the 1997 Stipulation 
as approved. Upon learning the Petitioner had died before the 1997 Stipulation was even 
proposed, ERF filed a motion to set aside the 1997 Stipulation arguing that ERF's 
signature had been obtained by fraud. (R. 00073-00117). Facing an evidentiary hearing 
wherein counsel for Petitioner was subpoenaed to testify regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the 1997 Stipulation, Petitioner ultimately agreed with ERF's motion and the 
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1997 Stipulation was set aside. (R. 00589). Because the 1997 Stipulation was set aside, it 
is as if it did not exist and can have no binding or evidentiary effect on the parties. 
III. EVEN ASSUMING PETITIONERS INJURIES WERE THE RESULT 
OF AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT, HIS CLAIM TO WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS ABATED UPON HIS DEATH 
Even though ERF has clearly demonstrated that the determination of the Labor 
Commission was correct and that Petitioner's disability was not the result of an industrial 
accident, ERF presents the alternative argument that Petitioner's claim to permanent and 
total disability benefits abated upon his death. At the time of Petitioner's injury the law 
was clear that claims for workers' compensation benefits abated at the time of the 
employee's death if not previously reduced to an award. Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 218 P.2d 970, 974 (Utah 1950) (unless employee has 
reduced his claim to an award, his cause of action for injuries does not pass to his 
personal representative or his dependents); accord Heiselt Construction Co. V. Industrial 
Commission, 197 P. 589 (Utah 1921); Parker v. Industrial Commission, 50 P.2d 278 
(Utah 1935). As Petitioner died before his claim for permanent and total disability 
benefits was reduced to an award, his claim abated upon death under the then-applicable 
law and this action could not thereafter be concluded by his estate. This result was urged 
by ERF below and was accepted by the ALJ. (R. 00445-449). 
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In 2003 the Legislature added a provision to the Workers' Compensation Act providing: 
The personal representative of the estate of an employee may 
adjudicate an employee's claim for compensation filed under this chapter if 
in accordance with this chapter, the employee files a claim: 
(a) before the employee dies; and 
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or 
occupational disease for which compensation is payable under this chapter 
or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-423. This section was added to the Workers' Compensation 
Act eighteen years after Petitioner was attacked and more than six years after he filed a 
claim for permanent and total disability benefits. 
Workers' compensation claims are generally adjudicated under the statutes that 
existed at the time of the employee's injury. Wicat Systems v. Pellegrini, 111 P.2d 686, 
687 (Utah App. 1989) (citing Moore v. American Coal Co., 737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 
1987)); Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah App. 1987); 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). At the time 
Petitioner was injured, and even at the time he filed his Application for Hearing, Utah 
case law clearly confirmed that claims not reduced to an award abated upon the 
employee's death. 
The Labor Commission then determined that the 2003 statutory change might 
allow this claim to go forward. In doing so the Labor Commission did not consider the 
fact that the Legislature only change the law prospectively. "[A] statute generally cannot 
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be given retroactive effect unless the legislature expressly declares such an intent in the 
statute." Washington Nat'I Insurance Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665, 667 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3). There is nothing in the language of 
§ 34A-2-423 to even suggest that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive 
effect. None of the few exceptions to this strong policy is applicable to this case because 
§ 34A-2-423 clearly impacts the substantive rights of the parties. The statutory 
amendment enlarges the rights of an employee's personal representative to pursue an 
action that would have otherwise been lost and it eliminates a Defendant's protection 
from stale claims such as this, following the death of an applicant. Therefore, even if 
Petitioner's claim had risen from an industrial accident, Petitioner's claim abated upon his 
death and should have been dismissed as ordered by ALJ Harm on April 18, 2002.. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court should affirm the determination of the 
Labor Commission that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden to show that his 1985 
assault arose out or in the scope of his employment. Alternatively, the Court should 
affirm ALJ Hann's earlier Order that Petitioner's claim for permanent and total disability 
benefits for his 1985 injury abated upon his death. 
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Respectfully submitted this 12th day of October, 2005. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Wendy Bowden Crowther 
Attorneys for Respondent Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND were mailed by first-class mail 
this 17th day of June, 2005, postage prepaid and correctly addressed to the following: 
Virginius Dabney 
DABNEY & DABNEY 
1060 South Main Street, Suite 2 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 1981, 
1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1988 by The Michie 
Company, All rights reserved. 
TITLE 35. LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of 
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely 
self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and 
medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in 
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, 
and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52a; C.L. 1917, § 3113; L. 1919, ch. 63, § 1; R.S. 
1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-43; L. 1984, ch. 75, § 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. -- The 1984 amendment substituted "as provided in this chapter" 
in the first sentence for "as is herein provided"; added the second sentence; and 
made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "Each employee mentioned 
in § 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and" for "Every employee mentioned in Section 
35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee who is killed, 
by accident arising out of or" in the first sentence. 
Cross-References. -- Miner's hospital service, as affected by compensation, § 
35-6-1 et seq. 
Occupational diseases generally, § 35-2-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
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TITLE 35. LABOR -- INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CHAPTER 1. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
If an employee, who has at least a 10% whole person permanent impairment from 
any cause or origin, subsequently incurs an additional impairment by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, and if the 
additional impairment results in permanent total disability, the employer or its 
insurance carrier and the Employers' Reinsurance Fund are liable for the payment 
of benefits as follows: 
(1) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the first $20,000 of 
medical benefits and the initial three years of permanent total disability 
compensation as provided in this title. 
(2) Reasonable medical benefits in excess of the first $20,000 shall be paid 
in the first instance by the employer or its insurance carrier. Then, as provided 
in Subsection (5), the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall reimburse the employer or 
its insurance carrier for 50% of those expenses. 
(3) After the initial three-year period under Subsection (1) permanent total 
disability compensation payable to an employee under this title becomes the 
liability of and shall be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
(4) If it is determined that the employee is permanently and totally disabled, 
the employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for all prior payments 
of temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent partial disability 
compensation made as a result of the industrial accident. Any overpayment by the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall be reimbursed by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund under Subsection (6). 
(5) Upon receipt of a duly verified petition, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall reimburse the employer or its insurance carrier for the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund's share of medical benefits and compensation paid to or on behalf 
of an employee. A request for Employers' Reinsurance Fund reimbursements shall be 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 34A-2-423 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 34A. UTAH LABOR CODE 
CHAPTER 2. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
PART 4. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
34A-2-423 Survival of claim in case of death. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Estate" is as defined in Section 75-1-201. 
(b) "Personal representative" is as defined in Section 75-1-201. 
(2) The personal representative of the estate of an employee may adjudicate an 
employee's claim for compensation under this chapter if in accordance with this 
chapter, the employee files a claim: 
(a) before the employee dies; and 
(b) for compensation for an industrial accident or occupational disease for 
which compensation is payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
(3) If the commission finds that the employee is entitled to compensation under 
this chapter for the claim described in Subsection (2) (a) , the commission shall 
order that compensation be paid for the period: 
(a) beginning on the day on which the employee is entitled to receive 
compensation under this chapter; and 
(b) ending on the day on which the employee dies. 
(4) (a) Compensation awarded under Subsection (3) shall be paid to: 
(I) if the employee has one or more dependents on the day on which the 
employee dies, to the dependents of the employee; or 
( n ) if the employee has no dependents on the day on which the employee 
dies, to the estate of the employee. 
(b) The commission may apportion any compensation paid to dependents under 
this Subsection (4) in the manner that the commission considers just and 
equitable. 
(5) If an employee that files a claim under this chapter dies from the industrial 
accident or occupational disease that is the basis of the employee's claim, the 
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